Fundamentalism
The Parallax ViewFundamentalism is treated not simply as an ideological force confronting liberal order, but as a political category whose meaning and power depend on the relations that frame it. The book’s central reversal is that efforts to identify and contain a fundamentalist threat can help create a less compromising opposition, while the threat’s very lack of definition can sustain emergency measures and conceal the political choices made in its name.
A Threat That Must Remain Unsettled
The discussion of the War on Terror emphasizes a paradox of political threat: an enemy can be most useful to power when it remains spectral. If the danger is assigned too definite a source, political leaders may have to acknowledge that a whole religion cannot be equated with its fundamentalist adherents. The text notes that, after calls to rally against fundamentalism, political leaders including George W. Bush, Tony Blair, and Ariel Sharon also stressed that Islam was a religion of peace and tolerance, misused by fundamentalists. On this reading, preserving the distinction matters not only as a qualification but as part of how the enemy is represented: the threat must be invoked strongly enough to justify action, yet kept indistinct enough to remain available for that purpose.
An unspecified danger also invites political fantasy to supply its imagined content. The book connects this mechanism to sovereign power’s ability to invoke an exception to ordinary legal limits in the name of preserving the Law. In the contemporary setting, the danger is displaced onto an external enemy, whose supposed omnipresence helps legitimate a permanent state of emergency and preemptive action. Fundamentalism consequently enters a wider argument about how political authority turns an uncertain threat into a warrant for exceptional measures.
Intervention and the Production of Opposition
The book tests humanitarian justifications against the political and economic projects they may advance. It argues that the United States’ overthrow of Saddam Hussein, presented as a way to end the suffering of the Iraqi people, also served political-economic interests, including oil, and was grounded in a program of Western liberal democracy, private property, and integration into the global market. When humanitarian action is presented as merely preventing suffering, the text argues, it can implicitly prohibit the elaboration of a different collective project of social and political transformation.
A related argument concerns the consequences of the United States’ intervention in Iraq. The discussion invokes a distinction between authoritarian rulers, who are described as pragmatic and responsive to material or military pressures, and totalitarian leaders, who are characterized as ideological and less amenable to compromise. Saddam Hussein is presented as a corrupt authoritarian ruler whose brutal pragmatism had led him to collaborate with the United States during the 1980s. The book’s pointed conclusion is that the intervention generated a more uncompromising fundamentalist opposition, making pragmatic compromise more difficult. Fundamentalism here is not explained away, but its political growth is traced in part to the intervention intended to address the conditions invoked to justify war.
Political Categories and Their Consequences
The distinction between authoritarianism and totalitarianism also reveals how classifications can legitimize unequal policies. A 1979 argument associated with the Kirkpatrick Doctrine treated collaboration with right-wing authoritarian dictators as acceptable while calling for harsher treatment of Communist regimes. Its contrast between pragmatic rulers and selfless ideological fanatics made one kind of adversary seem manageable and another inherently dangerous. The Iraq example unsettles that scheme: a ruler classified as pragmatic was removed, while the opposition that followed was less open to pragmatic accommodation.
The book places this analysis alongside a broader critique of depoliticized human-rights intervention. Claims to defend individuals from suffering may obscure which political order an intervention seeks to establish and whether it leaves room for collective alternatives. Fundamentalism thus figures in an account of reciprocal political effects: it is represented as a threat, but it can also become stronger in the aftermath of policies that present themselves as its cure. The category carries political consequences both in the actions it authorizes and in the opposition those actions help produce.
